Iberia Foods Corp v. Romeo by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-30-1998 
Iberia Foods Corp v. Romeo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Iberia Foods Corp v. Romeo" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 178. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/178 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed July 30, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-5424 
 
IBERIA FOODS CORP. 
 
v. 
 
ROLANDO ROMEO, JR. 
d/b/a ROL-ROM FOODS 
 
Rolando Romeo, Jr., t/a 
Rol-Rom Foods, 
 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 93-cv-01690) 
 
Argued Monday, April 27, 1998 
 
BEFORE: ALITO, RENDELL and GARTH, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 30, 1998) 
 
       Stephen L. Baker (Argued) 
       Stephen L. Baker, P.A. 
       359 East Main Street 
       Somerville, New Jersey 08876 
 
       Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
  
       John G. Gilfillan, III (Argued) 
       Kenneth L. Winters 
       Carella, Byrne, Bain, Gilfillan, 
       Cecchi, Stewart & Olstein 
       6 Becker Farm Road 
       Roseland, New Jersey 07068 
 
       Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is a trademark action brought by Iberia Foods 
against Rolando Romeo, Jr. and his company, Rol-Rom 
Foods (collectively, "Rol-Rom"), to enjoin Rol-Rom's sale of 
household cleaning products under the Mistolin trademark 
owned by Iberia. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Iberia, and Rol-Rom has appealed. 
Because the Mistolin products sold by Rol-Rom are 
"genuine" under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
S 1114, we will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
Iberia Foods is a Brooklyn-based wholesale distributor of 
grocery store products that owns the United States 
trademark to Mistolin household cleaners. The line of 
Mistolin products includes soaps, tile cleaners, and laundry 
detergents, and is offered for sale at grocery stores and 
supermarkets both in Puerto Rico and in certain 
metropolitan areas in the United States for a few dollars a 
bottle.  
 
Mistolin products are manufactured exclusively in Puerto 
Rico by Mistolin Caribe, Inc. ("Caribe"). In addition to 
selling Mistolin to Iberia for resale in the United States, 
Caribe markets Mistolin directly to distributors in Puerto 
Rico for resale in the Puerto Rican market. Although both 
Iberia and Caribe sell Mistolin products, the two companies 
service entirely separate markets: Caribe sells Mistolin only 
in Puerto Rico to Puerto Rican distributors, and Iberia sells 
Mistolin only in the continental United States. 
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The business arrangement between Iberia and Caribe 
dates back to 1988, when Iberia acquired the United States 
trademark to Mistolin from Caribe's parent company, 
Mistolin Dominicana, C.A. ("Dominicana").1 Although the 
legal effect of the 1988 agreement is disputed, its terms 
granted Iberia "all the rights, title and interest in and to 
[the Mistolin] trademark insofar as they relate to the United 
States." In exchange for ownership of the Mistolin 
trademark, Iberia agreed to purchase Mistolin exclusively 
from Caribe. 
 
The defendant in this case, Rol-Rom Foods, is a New 
Jersey-based distributor of household cleaning products 
that purchases Mistolin products on the open market in 
Puerto Rico and sells them in New York and New Jersey. 
Although Rol-Rom has never purchased Mistolin products 
directly from Caribe, it is undisputed that the Mistolin sold 
by Rol-Rom was originally sold by Caribe for resale in the 
Puerto Rico market. By obtaining Mistolin in Puerto Rico 
and selling it in New York without Iberia's involvement, Rol- 
Rom has been able to offer Mistolin for sale in direct 
competition with Iberia at a substantial discount from 
Iberia's price. 
 
II. 
 
In April 1993, Iberia filed a four count complaint against 
Rol-Rom seeking injunctive relief and damages. The 
principal count in the complaint alleged that Rol-Rom's sale 
of Mistolin products constituted infringement of Iberia's 
trademark in violation of S 32 of the Lanham Act, codified 
at 15 U.S.C. S 1114.2 Rol-Rom's answer denied that it had 
infringed Iberia's mark, alleged several affirmative defenses, 
and added a number of counterclaims. Following discovery, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Caribe is technically a subsidiary of Dominicana, for the 
sake of simplicity we will refer to Caribe rather than Dominicana when 
discussing the 1988 agreement. This substitution has no effect on our 
resolution of this appeal. 
 
2. The remaining counts against Rol-Rom alleged violations of common 
law trademark and service mark infringement, common law unfair 
competition, and New Jersey statutory unfair competition under N.J.S.A. 
56:4-1. 
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both parties moved for summary judgment on the federal 
trademark infringement count. 
 
Before the district court on summary judgment, Iberia 
argued that Rol-Rom had clearly infringed Iberia's 
trademark. According to Iberia, the 1988 agreement 
between Iberia and Caribe had transferred the rights to the 
Mistolin trademark in the continental United States to 
Iberia, but had allowed Caribe to retain the trademark 
rights to Mistolin in Puerto Rico. By buying Mistolin in 
Puerto Rico and selling it in the continental United States, 
Iberia contended, Rol-Rom had circumvented the quality 
control measures enforced by Iberia on all the Mistolin 
products it sold. Accordingly, Iberia claimed, Rol-Rom's 
Mistolin was not "genuine," and Rol-Rom's sales constituted 
infringement of Iberia's trademark because it injured the 
goodwill Iberia had invested in the mark. 
 
Rol-Rom's view of the case contrasted sharply with 
Iberia's. According to Rol-Rom, the 1988 agreement had 
transferred all of Caribe's United States trademark rights to 
Iberia. Because Puerto Rico is considered part of the 
"United States" for the purpose of federal trademark law, 
see 15 U.S.C. S 1127, Rol-Rom claimed that the 1988 
agreement had granted Iberia the Mistolin trademark rights 
in Puerto Rico as well as in the continental United States. 
According to Rol-Rom, Iberia's longstanding failure to 
challenge Caribe's sales of Mistolin to Puerto Rican 
distributors provided Rol-Rom with two affirmative defenses 
to Iberia's action. First, Rol-Rom argued that Iberia's failure 
to exercise control over its mark constituted a"naked 
license" that had led to de facto abandonment of the 
Mistolin trademark.3 Second, Rol-Rom claimed that Iberia 
had impliedly consented to Caribe's sales of Mistolin in 
Puerto Rico, such that Iberia had relinquished its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Rol-Rom's pleadings describe its abandonment argument as a 
counterclaim, rather than as an affirmative defense. Abandonment, 
however, is generally considered an affirmative defense to infringement, 
rather than the type of actionable wrong that would sustain an 
independent claim or counterclaim. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford 
Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1075-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 
299 (1997). For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to Rol-Rom's 
abandonment argument as an affirmative defense. 
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trademark rights to the Mistolin sold by Rol-Rom pursuant 
to the "first sale" or "exhaustion" doctrine.4 
 
On March 26, 1996, the district court entered an order 
denying Rol-Rom's motion for summary judgment and 
granting Iberia's summary judgment motion. Addressing 
Rol-Rom's defenses first, the district court held that Rol- 
Rom's first sale and abandonment defenses were meritless 
because the uncontroverted evidence in the record made 
clear that neither Caribe nor Iberia had intended that Iberia 
would possess the right to prevent Caribe from marketing 
Mistolin in Puerto Rico. When Caribe and Iberia had agreed 
to transfer the Mistolin trademark rights to Iberia "insofar 
as they relate to the United States," the district court held, 
they had intended to transfer only the rights covering the 
continental United States, where Iberia was already 
distributing Mistolin products. Because Iberia had no right 
to control Caribe's sales of Mistolin in Puerto Rico, it had no 
ability either to authorize Caribe's "first sale" of Mistolin or 
to grant Caribe a "naked license" to sell it in Puerto Rico. 
Accordingly, the district court held that the first sale 
(exhaustion) and abandonment doctrines were inapplicable. 
In any event, the district court noted, the Mistolin 
trademark had clearly not been abandoned because the 
mark continued to have significance among purchasers in 
the continental United States. 
 
Having dispensed with Rol-Rom's affirmative defenses, 
the district court turned to Iberia's motion for summary 
judgment. Here, the district court referenced its prior 
discussion of Iberia's view that the Mistolin sold by Rol-Rom 
was not "genuine" because it never passed through Iberia's 
post-manufacture quality controls. In that discussion, the 
district court had also noted the presence of "record 
evidence showing that [Iberia] has in fact instituted some 
quality control procedures over products it received from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. According to the "first sale" or "exhaustion" doctrine, a trademark 
owner's authorized initial sale of its product into the stream of commerce 
extinguishes the trademark owner's rights to maintain control over who 
buys, sells, and uses the product in its authorized form. See, e.g., 
Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
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Caribe." In its motion for summary judgment, Iberia argued 
that this evidence entitled Iberia to summary judgment on 
its federal trademark infringement count. The district court 
agreed, although it did not specify the basis for its implicit 
conclusion that Rol-Rom's Mistolin was not "genuine." 
 
The litigation regarding Iberia's remaining claims and 
Rol-Rom's counterclaims continued until June 4, 1997, 
when the district court acceded to the parties' request to 
enter a final order and injunction that would allow Rol-Rom 
to pursue an appeal without further delay. The final order 
enjoined Rol-Rom from selling Mistolin products that had 
not first been distributed by Iberia, and ordered that if Rol- 
Rom violated the injunction it would be held in contempt, 
fined, and forced to pay Iberia's attorney's fees. Further, the 
final order stated that Rol-Rom's counterclaims and Iberia's 
claim for damages were withdrawn with prejudice, subject 
to the right of the parties to reinstate their claims if the 
district court's March 26, 1996 were to be reversed on 
appeal.5 
 
Rol-Rom filed a timely appeal. We will reverse. 
 
III. 
 
On summary judgment, we exercise plenary review, 
construing all evidence and resolving all doubts raised by 
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file in favor of the non-moving party. See 
SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 
1997). Our task is to identify and explain the substantive 
law governing the action, and then in light of that law 
determine whether there is a genuine dispute over 
dispositive facts. See Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although we need not reach such issues to resolve Iberia's S 32 claim, 
we think it is proper in light of the district court's arrangement and our 
remand to note that we agree with the district court's conclusion that 
the 1988 agreement transferred to Iberia only those trademark rights 
relating to the continental United States. Thus, we agree with the 
district 
court that Iberia owns the trademark rights to Mistolin in the continental 
United States; that Caribe retains the rights to Mistolin in Puerto Rico; 
and that Rol-Rom's abandonment and "first sale" arguments are 
meritless. 
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Tobacco Corp., 143 F.3d 139, 145 (3rd Cir. 1998) (citing 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. 
Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed.2d 202 (1986)). If upon review of 
cross motions for summary judgment we find no genuine 
dispute over material facts, then we will order judgment to 
be entered in favor of the party deserving judgment in light 
of the law and undisputed facts. See Ciarlante, 143 F.3d at 
145-46. 
 
IV. 
 
Although the parties have devoted their attention to the 
merits of Rol-Rom's affirmative defenses, we consider the 
primary question raised by this appeal to be one addressed 
only in passing by the parties. The question is: has Iberia 
established that the Mistolin sold by Rol-Rom is not 
"genuine" according S 32 of the Lanham Act? Because we 
conclude that Iberia has failed to establish that the Mistolin 
sold by Rol-Rom is not "genuine," we hold that Rol-Rom is 
entitled to summary judgment, and that the order of the 
district court must be reversed. 
 
A. 
 
Iberia's federal trademark claim proceeds under S 32 of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1114.6  Under the sway of 
Justice Holmes's landmark opinion in A. Bourjois & Co. v. 
Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 43 S. Ct. 244 (1923), courts have 
construed this statute to grant trademark owners the right 
to enjoin the sale of products containing the owner's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This statute states in relevant part that: 
 
       (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-- 
 
       (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable 
       imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering 
       for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on 
or 
       in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or 
       to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . 
 
        . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the 
       remedies hereinafter provided. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1114 (1997). 
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authentic mark when the products offered for sale are 
similar but not identical to those offered by the trademark 
owner. The need for such protection has arisen most often 
in the context of so-called "gray goods" cases. In such 
cases, holders of United States trademarks affixed to 
products manufactured abroad have used S 32 of the 
Lanham Act as a means of preventing the sales of inferior 
parallel imports. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, 
Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(owner of Cabbage Patch Kids trademark entitled to 
injunctive relief from sales in United States of Spanish 
version of dolls without "adoption" feature). The scope of 
the action is not limited to gray goods cases, however. The 
same theory has been used to enjoin the sale of domestic 
products in conditions materially different from those 
offered by the trademark owner. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert 
Co. v. Northside Dev. Co., 86 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1996) (owner 
of Halls cough drops trademark entitled to injunction 
against sale of Halls cough drops past their expiration 
date). 
 
As a matter of doctrine, a trademark owner attempting to 
use S 32 to prevent an infringement must establish that the 
products sold by the alleged infringer are not "genuine." 
See, e.g., Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 
659, 671-73 (3d Cir. 1989); El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. 
Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395-99 (2d Cir. 1986); Shell 
Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107-08 
(4th Cir. 1991). The test for whether an alleged infringer's 
products are genuine asks whether there are "material 
differences" between the products sold by the trademark 
owner and those sold by the alleged infringer. See Societe 
Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 
633, 638 (1st Cir. 1992); Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. 
Diamond & Gem Trading USA, 112 F.3d 1296, 1302 (5th 
Cir. 1997). If there are no material differences between the 
products sold, then the products offered by the alleged 
infringer are "genuine" and an infringement action under 
S 32 of the Lanham Act must fail. Whether differences are 
material so that an alleged infringer's products are non- 
genuine is a matter of law that we review de novo. See El 
Greco, 806 F.2d at 395; Casa Helvetia, 982 F.2d at 642, 
642 n.9. 
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The purpose of the material differences test is to 
determine whether the allegedly infringing products are 
likely to injure the goodwill developed by the trademark 
owner in the trademarked goods. See Weil Ceramics, 878 
F.2d at 671. When the products sold by the alleged 
infringer and the trademark owner contain identical marks 
but are materially different, consumers are likely to be 
confused about the quality and nature of the trademarked 
goods. See Casa Helvetia, 982 F.2d at 641. Characteristics 
of the alleged infringer's goods that are not shared by the 
trademark owner's goods are likely to affect consumers' 
perceptions of the desirability of the owner's goods. See 
Weil Ceramics, 878 F.2d at 671; Martin's Herend, 112 F.3d 
at 1302. Sales of the alleged infringer's goods will tarnish 
the "commercial magnetism" of the trademark, injuring the 
trademark owner. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. 
S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205, 62 S. Ct. 1022, 1024 
(1942) (Frankfurter, J.).7 In such circumstances, the alleged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. A few examples may prove helpful here. In Original Appalachian 
Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987), the 
Second Circuit granted an injunction to the owner of the United States 
trademark for Cabbage Patch Kids dolls against the importation of 
Cabbage Patch Kids dolls manufactured in Spain for the Spanish 
market. Although the Spanish dolls looked very similar to the domestic 
ones, the Spanish dolls lacked certain features (in particular, the 
ability 
to be "adopted" by the owner) that had sparked consumer interest and 
sales in the United States. The court held that the domestic trademark 
owner was entitled to an injunction because the domestic trademark 
owner's goodwill was injured by consumer association of its mark with 
the less desirable Spanish dolls. See 816 F.2d at 73. 
 
In Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 
633, 638 (1st Cir. 1992), the First Circuit granted an injunction to the 
owner of the United States trademark for Italian-made Perugina 
chocolates against the parallel importation of Venezuelan-made Perugina 
chocolates. The court catalogued a series of differences between the 
Venezuelan imports and the products sold by the trademark owner, 
including differences in the composition of the chocolate, the packaging, 
the price, and the conditions under which the chocolates were 
transported and stored. The court held that the differences were likely to 
result in consumer confusion and that the trademark owner was entitled 
to injunctive relief. See 982 F.2d at 644. 
 
                                9 
  
infringer's goods are considered "non-genuine" and the sale 
of the goods constitutes infringement. 
 
In contrast, when the differences between the products 
prove so minimal that consumers who purchase the alleged 
infringer's goods "get precisely what they believed that they 
were purchasing," Weil Ceramics, 878 F.2d. at 672, 
consumers' perceptions of the trademarked goods are not 
likely to be affected by the alleged infringer's sales. See 
Casa Helvetia, 982 F.2d at 641. Although consumers may 
be unaware of the precise avenues that a given product has 
traveled on its way to the supermarket shelf, the authentic 
trademark on the alleged infringer's goods is an accurate 
indicator of their nature and quality. Cf. Prestonettes, Inc. 
v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368, 44 S. Ct. 350, 351 (1924). 
Thus, the goods may be considered "genuine." This does 
not mean that the trademark owner suffers no economic 
harm from the alleged infringers' sales, but it does mean 
that S 32 of the Lanham Act does not offer a remedy to the 
trademark owner. See Weil Ceramics, 878 F.2d. at 672. 
 
Because consumer preferences are as fickle and diverse 
as the human imagination, it is impossible to devise an 
exhaustive list of the types of differences between products 
that can be considered material for the purposes of the 
genuineness test. Compare Granada Elecs., 816 F.2d at 73 
(holding that imported Cabbage Patch Kids dolls are 
materially different from domestic dolls because imported 
dolls cannot be "adopted" by domestic owners) with Shell 
Oil, 928 F.2d at 107-08 (holding that bulk oil purchased 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Finally, in Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading 
USA, 112 F.3d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit enjoined the 
parallel importation of Hungarian Herend porcelains brought to the 
United States over the objections of the United States trademark owner. 
The court held that there were material differences between the 
porcelains sold by the trademark owner and the alleged infringer 
because the trademark owner had chosen to sell only select items in the 
United States. The alleged infringer, in contrast, sold many items that 
were not offered by the trademark owner. In light of the delicate task of 
maintaining goodwill in high-end artistic products, the court held, this 
difference was enough to entitle the United States trademark owner to 
an injunction against the parallel importation. See 112 F.3d at 1302. 
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from Shell and resold by oil wholesaler was not genuine 
because it was not stored according to Shell's 
specifications). Any differences that are likely to damage the 
goodwill developed by the trademark owner can be deemed 
material. 
 
B. 
 
Iberia argues that material differences exist between the 
Mistolin sold by Rol-Rom and that sold by Iberia because 
Iberia conducts a "quality control" inspection of every 
shipment of Mistolin on receipt from Caribe. 8 According to 
the record, Iberia inspects every box of Mistolin it receives, 
and rejects products that do not meet its specifications. 
Iberia contends that its rejection of substandard goods has 
raised the quality of the Mistolin sold by Iberia so that it is 
materially different from the uninspected Mistolin sold by 
Rol-Rom. 
 
When a trademark owner arranges to have its mark 
placed on a product manufactured by another company, 
the owner's rigorous quality control and inspection 
procedure on receipt from the manufacturer has often been 
recognized as the basis of a material difference between 
products sold by the trademark owner and those offered by 
another company without the trademark owner's stamp of 
approval. See, e.g., El Greco, 806 F.2d at 395 (shoes); Casa 
Helvetia, 982 F.2d at 642 (chocolates). The reason for this 
is evident. Because the quality of a manufacturer's output 
can be uneven, and consumers can be expected over time 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In the "Statement of the Case" portion of its brief, Iberia remarks in 
passing that Rol-Rom has sold Mistolin products, and in particular, 
Mistolin All Purpose Cleaner, "which Iberia has discontinued and/or has 
determined not to sell under the Mistolin mark." Appellee's Br. at 8. Were 
this statement supported in the record, it might have provided the basis 
for a material difference between the Mistolin products sold by Iberia and 
Rol-Rom. See, e.g., Martin's Herend, 112 F.3d at 1302 (holding that 
parallel importer's porcelain figurines were materially different from 
trademark owner's figurines because "at least 50 percent" of the 
figurines sold by the parallel importer were not sold by trademark 
owner). Here, however, the record fails to support Iberia's statement: the 
record indicates that both Iberia and Rol-Rom discontinued selling 
Mistolin All Purpose Cleaner. See App. 167 (Iberia); App. 281 (Rol-Rom). 
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to notice the quality of the products they purchase, a 
trademark owner's inspection on receipt from the 
manufacturer may be a necessary part of maintaining 
consumer goodwill associated with its mark. Cf . Casa 
Helvetia, 982 F.2d at 643. 
 
Because quality control measures may create subtle 
differences in quality that are difficult to measure but 
important to consumers, courts do not require trademark 
owners to show that the actual quality of the inspected 
goods is measurably higher than that of the uninspected 
goods. See, e.g., El Greco, 806 F.2d at 395; Shell Oil, 928 
F.2d at 107. At the same time, "quality control" is not a 
talisman the mere utterance of which entitles the 
trademark owner to judgment. See, e.g., Polymer Tech. 
Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 78-80 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
trademark owner's claim of infringement based on 
circumvention of owner's quality control efforts). Rather, 
the test is whether the quality control procedures 
established by the trademark owner are likely to result in 
differences between the products such that consumer 
confusion regarding the sponsorship of the products could 
injure the trademark owner's goodwill. See Warner-Lambert 
Co. v. Northside Dev. Co., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(trademark holder must show that it uses substantial and 
nonpretextual quality control procedures such that non- 
conforming sales will diminish the value of the mark). 
 
According to Jesus Garcia, the chairman of the board of 
Iberia, Iberia's inspection of Mistolin upon receipt from 
Caribe consists of looking for "external self-evident 
problems." App. 139. First, the exterior packaging of the 
deliveries is inspected to make sure that the boxes are not 
damaged. Second, an Iberia employee takes a "random 
sample" of Mistolin and looks at it. If the packaging is 
damaged or there is "something wrong" with the sample, 
Iberia destroys the goods and receives credit from Caribe. 
Iberia has no standard explaining when there is"something 
wrong" with a sample, however: the employee simply looks 
at the Mistolin and smells it to determine whether or not it 
seems "off." Although Garcia stated in his deposition that 
Iberia sends products to a laboratory for inspection if 
something seems "wrong" with a shipment of Mistolin, 
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Garcia could not recall any time within the previous ten 
years when this was actually done. App. 136-40. 
 
The reason that Iberia's inspection is limited to looking 
for obvious defects is that since acquiring the trademark in 
1988, Iberia has never made any efforts to learn how Caribe 
manufactures Mistolin products or what ingredients they 
contain. App. 92 ("Iberia Foods Corp. has no knowledge as 
to what are the contents or ingredients used in the 
products manufactured by Mistolin Caribe Inc.") (statement 
of Jesus Garcia). Iberia simply orders Mistolin products 
from Caribe, and assumes that the bottles it receives 
contain "Mistolin" cleaner. In fact, Iberia's sole participation 
in the design or manufacture of any Mistolin product 
entailed helping Caribe design new U.S. labels when federal 
law began mandating that labels contain new product 
warnings. App. 147-48. Otherwise, everything about 
Mistolin, from its ingredients to the U.P.C. symbols placed 
on its bottles, has been determined by Caribe. The result of 
Iberia's "hands off " approach is that its quality control 
process is limited to determining whether the Mistolin 
products it receives from Caribe have been damaged during 
shipment, and whether random samples look and smell  
"right."9 
 
We conclude that Iberia's quality inspections are 
insufficient to create a material difference between the 
inspected Mistolin sold by Iberia and the uninspected 
Mistolin sold by Rol-Rom. By limiting its inspection to "self- 
evident" defects, Iberia does no more than weed out those 
bottles of Mistolin that are entirely unsaleable on the open 
market. This "weeding out" is insufficient because bottles 
so obviously defective as to be unmarketable are not likely 
to reach consumers in any event. First, distributors will 
generally try to catch such blatant defects to keep their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In the one instance in which Iberia rejected Mistolin sent by Caribe 
for 
a defect that was not obvious, Garcia conceded that the defect had not 
been discovered during Iberia's inspection. This occurred in 1993, when 
Caribe sent Iberia a shipment of Mistolin that looked normal when it first 
arrived, but later deteriorated in the bottle. Although Garcia did not 
explain how this defect was eventually discovered, he did state that it 
was not detected when the shipment underwent Iberia's quality control 
procedures. App. 136. 
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retailers happy: this is as true when the distributor 
happens to be the trademark owner as when the distributor 
is another company such as Rol-Rom. See App. 285 ("[W]e 
don't sell anything that's damaged or broken . . . because 
our clients wouldn't stand for it.") (statement of Rolando 
Romeo, Jr.). Those defects that do pass by the distributors 
will be caught by retailers, who are unlikely to place broken 
bottles of Mistolin on their shelves if they expect to stay in 
business for long. Because unmarketable Mistolin products 
will not generally reach consumers regardless of whether 
Iberia catches the defects first, Iberia's limited inspection is 
insufficient to create a material difference between the 
Mistolin offered to consumers through Iberia and that 
offered to consumers through Rol-Rom. 
 
The limited scope of the inspection performed by Iberia 
distinguishes this case from other cases in which a 
trademark owner's quality control mechanism created a 
material difference between the products offered by the 
trademark owner and the alleged infringer. In those cases, 
the trademark owner's inspection reflected a deliberate 
effort to ensure that the quality of the product matched the 
high standards set by the trademark owner. For example, 
in El Greco, the trademark owner's agent would inspect the 
manufacturer's product before shipment. Unless the agent 
issued an inspection certificate stating that the 
manufacturer's goods fully complied with the trademark 
owner's standards and specifications, the goods were never 
shipped to the trademark owner for sale. See 806 F.2d at 
395. In Casa Helvetia, the trademark owner conducted 
laboratory tests on the chocolates it received from the 
Italian manufacturer, destroyed those chocolates that were 
beyond a fixed expiration date, and transported its 
products in special refrigerated containers. Even the alleged 
infringer conceded that its quality control procedures 
differed "radically" from the strict regimen followed by the 
trademark owner to maintain the quality of the products 
sold. See 982 F.2d at 642-43. 
 
In both El Greco and Casa Helvetia, the trademark 
owner's inspection was an integral part of a careful effort to 
ensure that the quality of the product matched the high 
standards set by the trademark owner. Circumventing that 
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inspection threatened the trademark owner's efforts to 
maintain the goodwill that consumers associated with the 
mark. In this case, however, Iberia has hardly set any 
standard at all: rather, it has deferred almost entirely to 
Caribe's judgment of what Mistolin products are and how 
they are to be manufactured. Iberia's "hands off " approach 
has reduced its quality control inspection to a de minimis 
check designed to make sure that the products it receives 
from Caribe are not obviously unmarketable. We are 
satisfied that such an inspection is insufficient to create a 
material difference between the products sold by Iberia and 
those sold by Rol-Rom. 
 
V. 
 
Because there is no material difference between the 
Mistolin sold by Iberia and that sold by Rol-Rom, we hold 
that the Mistolin sold by Rol-Rom is "genuine" and that 
Iberia's attempt to use S 32 of Lanham Act to block Rol- 
Rom's sales must fail. Because buyers of Rol-Rom's Mistolin 
get precisely what they believe that they are purchasing, 
see Weil Ceramics, 878 F.2d at 672, the goodwill associated 
with Mistolin products is not harmed by Rol-Rom's sales. 
 
We therefore reverse so much of the district court's June 
4, 1997 order as entered judgment for Iberia on the federal 
trademark infringement count, and direct the district court 
to enter judgment for Rol-Rom on this count. Pursuant to 
the terms of the June 4, 1997 order, which directed the 
reinstatement of remaining claims if the district court's 
order were reversed, we will remand to the district court for 
further appropriate proceedings. 
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